Seasoned equity crowdfunded offerings by Coakley, Jerry et al.
Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (xxxx) xxx
Please cite this article as: Jerry Coakley, Journal of Corporate Finance, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101880
Available online 5 January 2021
0929-1199/© 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Seasoned equity crowdfunded offerings☆ 
Jerry Coakley a,*, Aristogenis Lazos b, José M. Liñares-Zegarra a 
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A B S T R A C T   
This paper conjectures that, just as SEO (seasoned equity offering) firms are likely to face fewer 
information asymmetry problems relative to IPO firms, the same applies to SECO relative to 
initial ECF (equity crowdfunding) campaign firms. This is mainly due to new information at a 
SECO - such as pre-money valuation gains – that reduces adverse selection problems. Using a 
sample of 709 UK ECF firms conducting a first SECO campaign over the 2011–2018 period, the 
probit results suggest that annualised valuation gains between the initial and SECO campaigns 
increases the probability of having a successful first SECO campaign but the equity offered lowers 
this probability. First SECO success is also related to different platform shareholder structures. 
The results show that the nominee model and coinvestment model dominate the direct model in 
terms of the probability of conducting a successful first SECO campaign. This is likely linked to 
reduced adverse selection and moral hazard problems stemming from no separation between 
ownership and control and enhanced due diligence and monitoring capabilities.   
1. Introduction 
The UK equity crowdfunding (hereafter, ECF) market is probably the most developed in the world. In 2011, the year when 
Crowdcube was launched, ECF was but a blip in the UK entrepreneurial finance market. Since then, the ECF market growth has 
exceeded all expectations and by 2019 it was second only to private equity (PE) – Venture Capital (VC) in terms of the number of equity 
deals (British Business Bank, 2019). ECF campaigns involve both initial and seasoned equity crowdfunded offerings (hereafter, SECOs) 
where the latter are the equivalent of seasoned equity offerings on the stock market. The term SECO is preferred to a follow-on offering 
as the latter can include a second initial ECF campaign after an unsuccessful first one whereas a SECO presupposes a successful initial 
ECF campaign. Initial campaigns have historically predominated in ECF market compared to SECO offerings. This is reflected in the 
ECF literature in that most studies to date have focused on aspects of initial campaigns (see for example, Ahlers et al., 2015; Estrin 
et al., 2018; Vismara, 2016; Vulkan et al., 2016). 
SECOs provide a unique lens through which to examine both the continued funding of the ECF firm against a background of 
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information asymmetries and their progress towards a successful exit via trade sale or an IPO. But how important are they? The British 
Business Bank (2019) reports that some 40% of companies initially funded by crowdfunding platforms went on to raise further funds 
via a SECO by 2019. Moreover, there were more SECO than initial ECF campaigns in 2019.1 These findings underline the growing 
importance of SECOs within the ECF market and these are the subject of this paper. In recent years, traditional entrepreneurial finance 
funds like business angels (hereafter BA) or VC are increasingly coinvesting in both initial ECF and SECO campaigns in the UK. Zhang 
et al. (2018) report that these funders accounted for 49% of total ECF funding in 2017. In this respect, both ECF platforms and 
institutional investors are helping to reduce the second equity gap problem identified by Wilson et al. (2018) for later stage, growth 
intensive ventures. 
This paper builds on the Chemmanur et al. (2010) view that SEO firms are likely to suffer from fewer information asymmetry 
problems relative to IPO firms as investors have more information on SEO relative to IPO firms, not least because the post-IPO firms are 
listed on a stock exchange. There is evidence that findings in IPO studies may help explain ECF phenomena (Vismara, 2018). Even 
though ECF firms remain private, SECO campaigns should still be characterised by lower information asymmetries. One important 
reason for lower SECO information asymmetries is the availability of new information on the startup’s performance since the initial 
ECF campaign. 
The first contribution of this paper is that it provides a novel investigation into what factors prompt firms to conduct a first SECO 
and the drivers of its success for a sample of 709 firms that enjoyed successful initial campaigns on the top three UK platforms – 
Crowdcube, Seedrs, and SyndicateRoom – over the 2011–2018 period. It conjectures that startups are likely to face fewer information 
asymmetry problems in their first SECO relative to their initial campaign because important pieces of new information are available for 
a first SECO firm. The most important of these relates to its pre-money valuation (i.e. the pre-campaign valuation) gains between the 
initial and SECO campaign. This paper exploits the pre-money valuations of both initial and first SECO campaigns to construct a novel 
financial performance metric capturing the valuation gains earned by the ECF firm over this period. A valuation gain between the 
initial campaign and first SECO can create a certification effect, which in turns mitigates the lemon and other adverse selection 
problems faced by potential SECO investors. This is one of the key insights of the paper. 
Our sample includes 709 firms that conducted a successful initial ECF campaign. Of these, 105 (14.81%) conducted a first SECO 
campaign of which 88 were successful. Our probit results reveal that initial campaign characteristics increase the probability of 
conducting a first SECO campaign. This is in line with the findings of Signori and Vismara (2018) for a sample of Crowdcube follow-on 
campaigns. Our most novel results relate to the probability of a successful first SECO. They indicate that this probability is increased by 
valuation gains between the initial and first SECO campaigns as well as by initial investor numbers. In this sense, both the firm’s 
valuation gains and the wisdom of the crowd can be seen as mitigating potential adverse selection problems in the process of achieving 
a successful SECO. By contrast, the probability of a successful first SECO is lowered by the share of equity offered in the initial 
campaign. The latter can be seen as an anchor or reference point (Baker et al., 2012) in the sense that a high share of equity offered in 
the initial campaign proxies for potential opportunistic behaviour by the owners. These results complement the findings of Hornuf 
et al. (2018) on follow-on private investment for a sample of UK and German startups. They also add to the literature on follow-on 
funding by ECF firms and in this respect complement the work of Signori and Vismara (2018), Hornuf et al. (2018) and Kleinert 
et al. (2019). 
The paper’s second contribution is that it adds to an emerging literature on cross-platform characteristics and the impact of 
different platform shareholder structures on initial ECF campaigns (Rossi et al. (2019), Vismara (2018), Cumming et al. (2019b,c)). 
This literature has focused mainly on adverse selection problems. By contrast, the current paper also investigates how the variation in 
monitoring the ECF firm across the three different types of shareholder structures might shed light on moral hazard issues over the 
period between the initial and SECO campaigns. In this regard, we conjecture that cross-platform effects will impact both on the 
decision to conduct a SECO campaign and on its probability of success. We follow Cumming and Johan (2020) and identify three 
distinct shareholder structures (based on their post-campaign monitoring efforts) employed by the three leading ECF platforms in our 
study: direct model (Crowdcube), nominee model (Seedrs), and coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom). 
Our probit findings on a successful first SECO campaign indicate that both nominee and coinvestment models have a higher 
probability of conducting a successful SECO campaign compared to campaigns employing the direct model on Crowdcube. They 
suggest that potential moral hazard problems are mitigated by the monitoring capabilities of these platforms and the latter contributes 
towards their success. These findings are also consistent with the findings of Cumming et al. (2019b) who establish that the separation 
between ownership and control on Crowdcube has a negative impact on follow-on funding. 
We also study how shareholder structures may affect the impact of our key variables of interest on the probability of conducting a 
successful first SECO campaign. The conclusion is that the nominee model dominates the direct and coinvestment model in terms of the 
probability of first SECO success as each of our variables of interest varies, with the exception of initial campaigns with large investor 
numbers. The implication is that Seedrs’ lack of separation between ownership and control and its continuous monitoring and regular 
valuations of startups mitigates both adverse selection and potential moral hazard problems relating to a successful first SECO. Overall, 
the results underline the importance of cross-platform shareholder structures in the study of the factors affecting the probability of 
conducting a successful first SECO campaign. This is consistent with studies such as Cumming et al. (2019b), Rossi and Vismara (2018) 
and Rossi et al. (2019) that stress the importance of ECF platform differences for initial campaigns. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the UK ECF setting for our study, the follow on funding literature, and the 
1 Our sample finishing in 2018 does not reflect this trend as it excludes private or pre-emption SECOs where additional shares are offered to 
existing shareholders only. These are the SECO equivalent of rights issue SEOs. 
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hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents our data and research design and Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Equity crowdfunding literature and hypotheses 
Given the analogy between SECOs and SEOs, the first subsection discusses equity crowdfunding and London’s Alternative In-
vestment Market (AIM) market. The second discusses the role of the different ECF platforms in the UK ECF market. Startups that 
successfully embark on an initial ECF campaign remain private or unlisted firms. However, recent literature stresses that they morph 
into a new type of firm – the ECF firm - with its own special characteristics. This is followed by a discussion of post-initial campaign 
funding and our testable hypotheses. 
2.1. Equity crowdfunding and AIM markets 
The UK SECO (ECF) market needs to be viewed in the context of UK enjoying the most developed equity market for small businesses 
in the world. This has two main components. On one hand, London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) or growth market for SMEs 
was established in 1995 and has become a runaway success as Vismara et al. (2012) highlights. AIM allows private SMEs to go public 
for the first time via an IPO without the need to produce a costly prospectus. Once they are public limited liability companies (enjoy 
PLC status), they can return to AIM for additional equity via a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Both IPOs and SEOs on AIM have thrived 
and now easily outnumber their corresponding number on the Main Market. Moreover, Stamou et al. (2020) highlight the rise of serial 
(repeat) SEOs particularly on AIM where each AIM firm enjoys an average of 5 SEOs over the course of the 1995–2015 period. 
On the other hand, the ECF market has developed extremely rapidly in the UK as a novel source of pre-IPO outside equity for 
startups since 2011. It is interesting to outline the major similarities and contrasts between both markets. The similarities include the 
following. First, both offer small firms the possibility of their first outside equity offerings which are accomplished via an IPO on AIM or 
via an initial ECF offering on a crowdfunding platform such as Crowdcube. Second, both offer small firms the possibility of follow-on or 
seasoned outside equity offerings. These are accomplished via an SEO on AIM or via a SECO on crowdfunding platforms. Third, both 
are lightly regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in conjunction with Nomads on AIM and the platforms in the ECF 
market. This typically includes being exempted from the cost of producing a prospectus for all but the largest campaigns. Finally, both 
are world leaders in their respective markets. 
There are also some important differences between the two markets. First, a private firm going public via an IPO becomes a public 
firm or PLC immediately thereafter. By contrast, a private firm raising crowdfunded equity continues to remain a private ECF firm. 
Second, there is a sharp contrast between the limited number of institutional investors in an AIM IPO (SEO) and the typically large 
numbers of investors in an initial or SECO campaign. However, BA, VC and other institutional investors are increasingly participating 
through coinvesting in ECF campaigns. Third, the offer mechanism differs sharply in both cases. Ironically, this involves an open offer 
to the public or crowd in ECF campaigns while the current dominant private placement mechanism on AIM involves shares being 
privately placed among institutional investors. Fourth, the UK authorities permitted the maximum EU prospectus exemption limit of 
€5 m for firms in initial and SECO campaigns and AIM IPOs (where relevant) over the sample period. By contrast, the SEO exemption 
threshold was specified as 10% of the issuer’s equity capital at the time of the SEO up to July 2018 when it increased to 20%.2 
Finally, it is important to stress that both markets are linked in one very important respect. A successful startup will typically go 
through several funding rounds before it exits via a trade sale (takeover) or an AIM IPO. Exits earn a carried interest fee of around 7.5% 
on any profit made.3 These rounds can include one or more SECOs or equity injections from a VC or BA. Signori and Vismara (2018) 
found that, for their sample of 212 crowdfunded firms on Crowdcube, 54 had at least one SECO (which they call a public SEO) and 
some 20 enjoyed a BA or VC investment. 
2.2. UK ECF platforms 
The UK ECF market exhibits a high degree of cross-platform differences and diversity in their shareholder structures. It is domi-
nated by the Big 3 platforms - Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom – that accounted for around 80% of the total ECF funding and 
successful ECF campaigns in 2018. They share many similarities. They all adopt the All-or-nothing (AON) approach to funding 
(Cumming et al., 2019a) where the strartup receives nothing unless the goal is reached, they employ a posted (fixed) pricing rather 
than an auction mechanism (Einav et al., 2018), they permit overfunding beyond the target capital, they specify lower bounds for 
investors, and they all permit the involvement of institutional investors. However, the platforms also exhibit significant differences 
mainly related to their shareholder governance structures that have implications for both initial ECF campaigns and SECO offerings. 
ECF platforms play an increasingly important role in screening applicant firms for their investors through their due diligence 
processes. Recent cross-platform studies, such as Rossi and Vismara (2018), Rossi et al. (2019), and Cumming et al. (2019) investigate 
the due diligence and other services performed by different ECF platforms. The upshot is that the majority of ECF applicants are 
rejected by the platforms. Zhang et al. (2018) report that the onboarding or qualification rate in the UK ECF market steadily increased 
2 The new EU Prospectus Regulation in June 2017 that came into effect in July 2018 continues with separate exemption limits 20% of equity 
capital for IPOs and SEOs and €8 m for ECF campaigns. See Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017) for an interesting study of ECF regulation.  
3 See https://help.seedrs.com/en/articles/1782437-what-fees-does-seedrs-charge-investors 
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from 20.6% in 2015 to 32.6% in 2017. Thus in 2017, more than two thirds (67.4%) of ECF applicants were rejected or filtered out 
following platform due diligence. 
Rossi et al. (2019) were the first to study the impact of cross-platform effects on voting rights in initial ECF campaigns. Their 
analysis reveals a large variety in ECF corporate governance mechanisms generally and in voting rights delivery more particularly. 
From a study of 185 platforms across 10 countries, they highlight the contrast between the individual voting rights on platform such as 
Crowdcube and pooled voting rights on Seedrs. They also identify syndicate-like platforms like SyndicateRoom in the UK and ASSOB in 
Australia that are open to accredited investors only and that attract fewer campaigns. This paper follows Cumming and Johan (2020) in 
linking each three broad shareholder governance structures for ECF firms to one of the Big 3 UK platforms. The first is what Cumming 
et al. (2019b) call the direct ownership model (Crowdcube). Here the investors are the direct owners of the equity offered but, but as 
Cumming et al. (2019b) point there is a separation between ownership and control caused by the dual class shares offered – A- and B- 
shares. 
The second is the nominee model (Seedrs) where the nominee (platform) is the legal owner of the ECF shares and the investors are 
the beneficial owners. In this case, the platform as legal owner has strong incentives to monitor the ECF firm to maintain its repu-
tational capital as it is a repeat player in the ECF market (Rossi et al., 2019). Moreover, the platform implicitly monitors financial 
performance by determining the fair value of ECF firm shares that can be bought and sold on it emerging secondary market in ECF 
shares. The final shareholder structure is the so-called coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) which adopts a similar approach in some 
respects to BA or VC syndicates by requiring a professional investor as part of the funders. The lead investor – an angel who does due 
diligence and contributes 25–40% of the target capital - has a very strong inventive not only to monitor the ECF firm but also to mentor 
with her advice and experience to enhance ECF firm performance. Note that SyndicateRoom also adopted the nominee structure in 
November 2015. But the active mentoring role of the lead investor distinguishes it from Seedrs. 
2.3. The ECF firm and post-campaign funding 
The academic research on ECF is rapidly growing as evidenced by several recent review papers: Mochkabadi and Volkmann (2018) 
and Coakley and Lazos (2020) focusing on equity crowdfunding, Wallmeroth and Wirtz (2018) covering publications on venture 
capital, business angels and equity crowdfunding, and Herve and Schwienbacher (2018) covering ECF and innovation. Vanacker et al. 
(2019) point out that there is only limited research on what happens after an initial ECF campaign. They provide an overview of what 
happens after a crowdfunding campaign, where the latter is broadly defined to include both reward-based and equity crowdfunding, 
with a special focus on firm failure, follow-on fundraising and firm performance. 
Several recent studies broadly share our focus on the post-initial campaign lives of firms. First, Signori and Vismara (2018) study 
212 firms that had a successful initial ECF on the Crowdcube platform in the 2011–2015 period and then investigate their subsequent 
life cycle until August 2017. The sample distribution of the study was as follows: 54 firms had a SECO campaigns (dubbed public SEO), 
20 had VC or BA investments (private SEO), 3 were involved in an M&A, 38 firms failed while 97 remained active (i.e. no additional 
capital was raised). Using a Heckman 2-stage competing risk regression approach, the authors study the factors affecting the hazard of 
various post-initial campaign scenarios versus competing events that include firm failure. Their results indicate that positive sales, non- 
executive directors, patents, and quick success were significantly positive determinants of raising additional public and private capital 
(being acquired). 
Cumming et al. (2019b) study separation between ownership and control rights on the Crowdcube platform. They find that a higher 
separation lowers the probability of success of an ECF offering, the likelihood of attracting professional investors, and the long-run 
prospects of the ECF firm. The long-run prospects of the ECF firm are related to the probability of follow-on funding like a SECO, 
of going public via an IPO or being targeted in an M&A. This paper also considers the endogenous nature of ownership and governance 
characteristics in the initial ECF offerings and in SECOs. 
Hornuf et al. (2018) broaden the scope of follow-on financing. They investigate the determinants of successful follow-up VC/BA 
campaigns and firm failure where the number of successful follow-on campaigns is used as an explanatory variable. Their dataset 
includes 14 different ECF platforms and 426 firms that ran at least one successful campaign in Germany or the UK (using either 
Crowdcube or Seedrs platforms). First, they conclude that German firms which received ECF funding are more likely to fail compared 
to those in the UK. Second, the number of senior managers, successful follow-on ECF campaigns and the number of VC investors 
increase the probability of success for a private follow-up campaign, while firm age decreases the probability of success. Finally, they 
find that a successful private follow-up campaign decreases the probability of firm failure. 
Kleinert et al. (2019) provide an interesting discussion of the role of prior financing (including ECF) as a certification effect on firm 
quality using a sample of 221 business plans and project descriptions for startups with ECF campaigns over April 2017–April 2018 on 
Crowdcube. They find that almost half their sample firms had previously succeeded in raising external funds from a variety of sources 
including ECF platforms. Their results indicate that prior financing positively impacts seasoned ECF campaign success. They find a 
stronger effect on crowdfunding success for larger firms that raised external funds from multiple sources and for seed firms with a prior 
successful crowdfunding ECF campaign.4 
4 All the papers discussed adopt a quantitative approach to post-campaign funding. By contrast, Bessière, Stéphany, and Wirtz (2019) adopt a 
detailed case study approach that highlights the complex trajectory of follow-on funding at a technology startup and its interaction with emerging 
governance structure dynamics. 
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2.4. Hypothesis development 
Since startups and ventures remain private after their initial ECF campaign, they continue to be beset by severe information 
asymmetries. Drawing on signalling theory (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011), we posit that SECO success will be related to signals 
from the initial ECF campaigns following Ahlers et al. (2015) and Vismara (2016) and also to signals from the ECF firm based on new 
information available at the start of the SECO campaign. An example of the later is the venture seeking follow-on outside equity sends 
signals to potential investors about for example its pre-money valuation gains in an effort to reduce information asymmetries. 
2.4.1. Initial and first SECO campaign signals 
The total number of investors is a signal of crowd interest in the initial campaign. One can view it as an indicator of the wisdom of 
the crowd (Mollick and Nanda, 2015). The wider the crowd participation, the more likely a campaign can avail of its wisdom leading to 
a lowering of adverse selection problems. Second, the wisdom of the crowd may also be linked to social or other networks. Brown et al. 
(2018) study the impact that personal and business networks and network changes during the crowdfunding process have on the 
outcome of ECF campaigns. Their findings reveal that networks play an important role for campaign success. Thus, widespread crowd 
participation in the initial campaign could also proxy for a well-developed network between the startup and the crowd and this is likely 
to lead to campaign success (see Vismara, 2018). 
In the presence of herding however, the number of investors may not be a good signal for networks. Recent ECF studies suggest that 
naïve herding is absent and the crowd may be wise after all. Asterbo et al. (2019) focus on herding in ECF employing data from Seedrs. 
Their results are inconsistent with naïve herding, thus lending support to the wisdom of the crowd. Wang et al. (2019) focus on the UK 
ECF market and find that there is an exchange of information between both qualified investors (angels) and between angels and retail 
investors (crowd). They conjecture that these complementarities in information flows improves the overall efficiency of the market. 
This leads to the following crowd participation hypothesis: 
H1. Crowd participation in the initial ECF campaign increases the firm’s probability of conducting a (successful) first SECO. 
The proportion of equity raised in the initial campaign matters to potential investors as it gives an indication of the founders’ skin in 
the game measured by their equity retention. The higher the equity retention, the lower the proportion of equity offered in a campaign 
and so the lower the likelihood of moral hazard problems. This proportion offered sends a signal to potential outside investors about 
the entrepreneur’s commitment to her venture. A high percentage of equity offered may send a negative signal about possible 
opportunistic behaviour whilst a low percentage sends a positive signal. Ahlers et al. (2015) and Vismara (2016) document a negative 
relation between the equity offered and initial campaign success. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2. The initial campaign proportion of equity offered has a negative effect on conducting a (successful) first SECO. 
We conjecture that a first SECO success may also be affected by new information available to investors just before the first SECO. In 
this context, the most important is the pre-money firm valuation between the initial and follow-on campaigns and this is likely to 
matter for the success of a first SECO (Vanacker et al., 2019).5 Prior to each ECF campaign (both initial and SECO), the platform 
conducts a fair value exercise for the ECF firm that is published in the campaign documents. These data can be used to calculate the pre- 
money valuation gain for the startup. This gain is annualised for comparability between startups that conduct a first SECO at different 
(time) intervals after the initial campaign. This leads to the following hypothesis for the probability of a successful first SECO 
campaign. 
H3. A pre-money valuation gain between the initial campaign and first SECO increases the probability of a successful first SECO. 
2.4.2. Platform shareholder structures 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the big 3 ECF platforms operating in the UK market can be linked to the three different shareholder 
structures that Cumming and Johan (2020) identify. These dictate how the relationship between the shareholders (investors) and ECF 
firms are structured. They involve a contrast between the direct ownership model on Crowdcube and the other two models. Cumming 
et al. (2019b) identify a separation between ownership and control on this platform as the crowd of retail investors typically hold non- 
voting B-shares. By contrast the other two large platforms both enjoy features that enhance monitoring capabilities and so mitigate 
moral hazard issues. Seedrs is best known for pioneering the nominee account approach in the UK under which there is no separation 
between and control and where the platform monitors performance. Finally, SyndicateRoom operates the coinvestment or lead 
investor model. Here a business angel with skin in the game via a 25–40% stake is involved in both due diligence and in mentoring the 
ECF firm. We thus hypothesize that the monitoring possibilities on the nominee and coinvestment models will have both a direct and 
indirect impact on conducting a (successful) first SECO campaigns. 
H4a. ECF campaigns using nominee and coinvestment models have a higher probability of conducting a (successful) first SECO 
compared to direct models. 
H4b. Shareholder structure has an indirect impact on the probability of conducting a (successful) first SECO through interactions 
with our key variables of interest. 
5 We are grateful to our discussant Gianfranco Gianfrate for this helpful suggestion. 
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3. Data and research design 
This section outlines the data sources, discusses the variables, and describes the methodology employed in this study. 
3.1. Sample and data 
Our sample is based on a novel dataset covering the 3 biggest ECF platforms in the UK with three different shareholder structures: 
direct model (Crowdcube), nominee model (Seedrs) and coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom). The crowdfunding data are sourced 
directly from TAB that was formerly known as Crowdsurfer. TAB Dashboard is described as the most comprehensive source of in-
telligence regarding the alternative finance market.6 These data are augmented by firm-specific data sourced from Companies House 
that is a government agency website that makes available further information about all UK firms. Our study spans the period from April 
2011 (date of Crowdcube’s first successful campaign) to December 2018. The dataset consists of 709 firms with a successful initial 
campaign which were monitored to identify those that conducted at least one SECO.  
The details are given in Table 1. Panel A shows that 105 firms conducted a first SECO campaign and that 59 of these employed the 
direct model, with the remaining 29 and 17 employing the nominee and coinvestment model, respectively.7 Panel B shows that 88 
SECOs were successful with most of the unsuccessful campaigns (11) occurring on campaigns employing the direct model. Interest-
ingly, campaigns employing the direct and coinvestment models have very similar first SECO failure rates of around 18%. The nominee 
model’s low failure rate of 10% could be related to the superior monitoring facilities associated with this shareholder structure. 
3.2. Variables 
The study most closely related to ours is that of Signori and Vismara (2018) which focuses on the UK ECF market and studies the 
post-initial campaign life of 212 Crowdcube startups. We extend their study in two important directions. First, we focus not only on the 
determinants of SECOs (as theirs do) but also on the factors that impact on their success. Second our data covers the three major ECF 
platforms operating in the UK. This leads to a larger sample which requires additional variables to reflect the heterogeneity relating to 
platform ownership structures on which the campaigns take place. This enables us to study platform effects on the likelihood of a firm 
conducting a first SECO and of a first a successful SECO. 
Our first variable of interest – number of investors - overlaps with that employed by Signori and Vismara (2018). The (natural 
logarithm of the) number of investors in a campaign is a proxy for investor participation and gives an indication of the size of the 
crowd. It has been employed in other studies of initial ECF campaigns such as Ahlers et al. (2015), Vismara (2018), and Signori and 
Vismara (2018) in their study of follow on campaigns. Our second variable of interest is equity offered, which is the fraction of equity 
offered for sale by the startup. Since a publicly quoted firm’s SEO is affected by the percentage of equity offered in its IPO, it seems 
logical to postulate that an ECF firm’s SECO will be impacted by the percentage of equity offered in the initial ECF campaign. Ahlers 
et al. (2015) established that this has a negative impact on the probability of success of initial ECF campaigns. We conjecture that it 
exerts a similar effect on conducting a first SECO and its probability of success. 
Our remaining variable of interest that we call valuation gains is novel and has not been previously used in the ECF context to the 
best of our knowledge. It is one of the very few variables that quantifies an ECF firm’s financial performance and is also very timely as it 
is evaluated just prior to the SECO campaign going public. As such, it contributes substantially to lowering information asymmetries in 
the absence of any other up to date financial data for startups and ventures. As such, we would expect a positive impact of valuation 
gains on SECO success. This variable is measured by the annualised increase of the pre-money valuation amount (£m) of the startup 
over the period between of the start of the initial and first SECO campaigns.8 Note that stock price appreciation accounts for most (over 
80%) of the median gains. Valuation gains provide a superior measure of ECF firm financial performance than the firm’s audited 
company accounts. This is because startups’ annual accounts are typically subject to a light audit only, they are typically filed with a 
delay, and the accounting year will usually not coincide with the initial or SECO campaign start dates. 
We include a variety of control variables and two of these warrant a mention. The first is quick success which is a dummy variable 
for initial campaigns that reach their target in 20 days or less, which was also used by Signori and Vismara (2018) to predict the 
likelihood of a successful SEOs or M&As. The ratio of the SECO goal to initial campaign goal proxies for potential moral hazard 
problems. The remaining controls are the startup Age, (natural logarithm of) initial campaign target capital, and a technology firm 
dummy. Finally, we use platform-level dummy variables to control for shareholder structures. Full details and definitions are given in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. 
3.3. Methodology 
Since successful SECOs are only observed for those startups which have conducted a first SECO, estimating both events 
6 It was added on Thomson Reuters Eikon App studio in August 2017.  
7 It should be noted that 12 ECF firms in our sample have conducted follow-on SECOs (See Figure A1 in the Appendix). In particular, seven firms 
conducted one further SECO (i.e. post first SECO campaign), three firms conducted 2 further SECOs and two firms conducted 3 further SECOs.  
8 The variable is annualised for comparability purposes as the interval between initial and SECO campaigns vary considerably. 
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independently could lead to sample selection problems. The problem is that the unobserved variables that determine the success of first 
SECO may be correlated with the likelihood of the decision on conducting a first SECO and so lead to biased coefficient estimates. 
Therefore, in an alternative specification which complements our main results, we tested for selection bias by estimating maximum- 
likelihood probit models with sample selection. 
Table A2 in the Appendix presents the results from a probit model with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) which is 
estimated using the Stata “Heckprobit” routine (StataCorp, 2019). This model assumes that there is an underlying relationship (latent 
equation) yj* = Xjβ + μ1j such that we observe only the binary outcome (outcome equation: conducting a successful first SECO) yjprobit 
= (yj* > 0). The dependent variable, however, is not always observed. Rather, the dependent variable for observation j is observed if 
(selection equation: conducting a first SECO) yjselect = (Zjγ + μ2j > 0) where μ1~N(0,1); μ2~N(0,1); corr(μ1,μ2) = ρ (rho). When ρ = 0, 
there is no evidence of selection bias; the outcome and selection equations are independent, making estimation of the selection model 
unnecessary. 
However, since the model is estimated by maximum likelihood (ML), ρ is not directly estimated. Instead, the Heckprobit routine 





. A significant athrho indicates the presence 
of selection bias in the model. The estimated athrho in all four models in Table A2 is statistically insignificant which implies that ρ = 0. 
In addition, the Wald test at the foot of the table compares the log likelihood of the full model with sample selection with the sum of the 
log likelihoods of running simple probits. If the test is insignificant, there is no statistical difference between both models, suggesting 
that selection bias is not present and providing further support that ρ = 0. Results for the Wald test for independence of equations (i.e., 
under the null that ρ = 0) show that the χ2 statistic was not significant (p-value>0.5) across all models, thus confirming no evidence of 
selection bias.9 
We therefore did not account for selection bias in our main analysis and instead use the standard probit as our preferred estimation 
approach as this delivers consistent and unbiased estimates. A probit model is used to investigate two aspects of first SECOs: (i) the 
determinants of conducting a first SECO (where C = 1 if a firm conducts a first SECO campaign and C = 0 otherwise) and (ii) the 
determinants of a successful first SECO (S = 1 if a firm conducts a successful first SECO campaign and S = 0 otherwise) based on the 
following specifications: 
Pr(C = 1|X) = Φ(αc +Xc
′βc) (1)  
Pr(S = 1|X) = Φ(αs + Xs
′ βs) (2)  
where Φ(⋅) is the Gaussian distribution function, and Xc, Xs are the vectors summarizing the variables of interest and control variables 
discussed in the previous section for Eq. (1) and (2) respectively. 
All our models also include dummy variables to account for the year of the campaign. The empirical results are reported in terms of 
average marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probabilities of the occurrence of C = 1 and S = 1. The average marginal 
Table 1 
Sample ECF campaigns by platform.  
Panel A: First SECO campaigns   
First SECO campaign  
Full sample Not conducted Conducted 
Direct model (Crowdcube) 473 (100%) 414 (87.53%) 59 (12.47%) 
Nominee model (Seedrs) 154 (100%) 125 (81.17%) 29 (18.83%) 
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) 82 (100%) 65 (79.27%) 17 (20.73%) 
Total 709 (100%) 604 (85.19%) 105 (14.81%)   
Panel B: Outcomes for first SECO campaigns   
First SECO campaign outcomes  
First SECO campaigns Unsuccessful Successful 
Direct model (Crowdcube) 59 (100%) 11 (18.64%) 48 (81.36%) 
Nominee model (Seedrs) 29 (100%) 3 (10.34%) 26 (89.66%) 
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) 17 (100%) 3 (17.65%) 14 (82.35%) 
Total 105 (100%) 17 (16.19%) 88 (83.81%) 
Notes: Panel A shows the number and distribution (percentages over the total reported in parenthesis) of first SECO campaigns across shareholder 
structures (platforms). 
Panel B shows the number and distribution (percentages over the total reported in parenthesis) of the outcomes for first SECO campaigns across 
shareholder structures (platforms). 
9 See Table A2 in the Appendix for more details. 
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effects indicate the change in probability when the independent variable switches from the reference category to the category in 
question. The models in Eqs. (1) and (2) are estimated via maximum-likelihood and standard errors are clustered at the platform-level 
to account for potential correlation of errors within clusters (Petersen, 2009). 
4. Empirical results 
This section presents and discusses our probit results for a sample of 709 successful initial ECF campaigns and 105 first SECOs on 
the Big 3 UK platforms: Crowdcube, Seedrs, and SyndicateRoom. The data span the sample period from April 2011 to December 2018. 
It also includes a detailed analysis of the direct and indirect impact of platform shareholder structures on the probability of conducting 
(a successful) first SECO. 
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis. Around 15% of the startups in our sample 
conducted a first SECO and, among those firms, 84% were successful. Signori and Vismara (2018) found that 25% of their Crowdcube 
sample of 212 campaigns have conducted a SECO (public SEO). While 15% may seem low by comparison, one should note that our 
sample include two additional platforms - Seedrs and SyndicateRoom - which were launched several years later than Crowdcube. 
Moreover, around half of our sample of initial ECF campaigns were launched in the period 2016–2018, and this is a relatively short 
time window for these startups to contemplate a first SECO. The average number of the (natural logarithm) number of investors 
participating in the initial campaign was 158 (e5.06) while the median was 161 (e5.08). The average equity offered was 14.51% and the 
median was 13.05%. 
The mean annualised valuation gains between the start of the initial and first SECO campaign was £2.17 m while the median was 
£0.85 m.10 Note that stock price appreciation accounts for over 80% of the median gains. These data could imply that some of these 
startups may be potentially overvalued, and therefore could take advantage of windows of opportunity by using SECOs to issue 
overvalued equity like in the case of overvalued public firms do in SEOs.11 Table 2 also shows that 21% of our sample enjoyed quick 
success in the initial campaign where the target was reached in 20 days or less. Our sample is formed of mainly young firms between 
0 and 3 years old (68% of the sample) and half of them operate in the technology sector (51%). The mean (natural logarithm) target 
capital was £192.9 k (e12.17) while the median was £176.3 k (e12.06). Almost two thirds (64%) of the sample campaigns have a SECO 
goal that exceeds the initial campaign goal. 
Tables 3a and 3b show the correlation coefficients between the variables employed in our probit regressions for conducting a first 
SECO and conducting a successful first SECO, respectively. The highest unconditional correlations of − 0.846 between firm age 0–3 and 
firm age 4–9 is not an issue, given that the former is not included in our regression analysis. Examination of the correlation matrix more 
generally suggests that multicollinearity among the variables is unlikely to present problems. 
4.2. The probability of a first SECO and a successful first SECO campaign 
4.2.1. Factors affecting the probability of conducting a first SECO 
We use probit regressions to examine which variables impact on the probability of an ECF firm conducting a first SECO. The binary 
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if an ECF firm conducts a first SECO – whether successful or unsuccessful – and 0 otherwise. The 
results for probit Models 1–3 are presented in Table 4. Models 1 and 2 successively but separately introduce one variable of interest (Ln 
(Investors) and Equity offered) with a common set of control variables, while Model 3 employs both variables of interest simulta-
neously along with the full set of control variables. 
The Model 1 and 2 results separately show that our two variables of interest – Ln(Investors) and Equity offered – have mixed effects 
on the probability of conducting a first SECO with the former being significant at the 5% level while the latter is insignificant. Our 
Model 3 results confirms the Ln(Investors) result at the 5% level. The Ln(Investors) positive coefficient provides evidence that the 
wisdom of the crowd (Mollick and Nanda, 2015) could reduce potential adverse selection problems and increase the likelihood of ECF 
firms conducting a first SECO campaign. This result supports our Hypotheses 1, suggesting that 1% increase in the (natural logarithm 
of) number of investors, increases the probability of conducting a first SECO by 4.9%. Signori and Vismara (2018) find a negative sign 
for the number of investors in their study of the post-initial campaign life of Crowdcube startups. The difference in sign may be 
explained by the broader scope of their study and our larger sample of initial and SECO campaigns across the Big three ECF platforms in 
the UK. 
The Model 3 results confirm the insignificance of equity offered and this rejects our Hypothesis 2. The control variable results reveal 
that there is a positive marginal effect for quick success that is significant at the 1% level. Having a quick success in the early weeks of 
the initial campaign increases the likelihood of conducting a first SECO campaign by 7.9% on average in Model 3. The results also 
10 These pre-money Valuation gains are calculated simply as Val1 – Val0 where Val1 and Val0 are the pre-money valuations of the firm just prior to 
the start date of the first SECO and initial ECF campaigns, respectively. Only 4 of our sample of 105 ECF firms conducting a SEO have suffered losses 
(valuation gains<0) between campaigns.  
11 See Hertzel and Li (2010) for a study of overvalued firms engaging in SEOs. 
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reveal that older firms (≥10 years old) are less likely to conduct a first SECO campaign compared to younger firms (0–3 years old) and 
the coefficients are always significant at the 1% level. Both results are consistent with Signori and Vismara (2018) albeit they use quick 
success as a variable of interest. Finally, the Table 4 findings reveal that platform shareholder structures also matter in explaining the 
decision of ECF firms to conduct a first SECO campaign. The nominee (Seedrs) and coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) dummies are 
both positive and significant at the 1% level across all three models and these results support Hypothesis 4a. 
Table 5 shows the contrast estimates (i.e. differences in predicted probabilities between the various shareholder structures) based 
on the marginal effects related to shareholder structures reported on Table 4 (Model 3).12. The results suggest that ECF firms employing 
the nominee model and coinvestment model in their initial campaign on average are 10.9% and 25% more likely to conduct a first 
SECO campaign than those ECF firms employing a direct model (Crowdcube). These results can be interpreted as reflecting a sig-
nificant a role for monitoring and also perhaps for crowd shareholder rights on both shareholder structures (platforms) which would 
mitigate moral hazard problems. This is consistent with the Signori and Vismara (2018) significant finding for their qualified investor 
variable in the context of follow-on campaigns for Crowdcube. Our results are also broadly consistent with Rossi et al. (2019). They 
employ data from 185 ECF platforms across different countries and find that the direct ownership model lowers the likelihood of 
success in contrast with nominee model for initial ECF campaigns. 
4.2.2. Factors affecting the probability of conducting a successful first SECO campaign 
We employ probit regressions to examine the factors contributing towards achieving a successful first SECO campaign, based on a 
sample of firms which conducted a first SECO campaign. The binary dependent variable takes the value of 1 for an ECF firm that 
conducts a successful first SECO and 0 for unsuccessful campaigns. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 includes one new variable that utilises information from the SECO campaign. This is the pre-money (annualised) Valuation 
gains between the start of the initial and first SECO campaigns. It also includes a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio between the 
target capital of the first SECO and the target capital of the initial campaign is higher than one in all models. Models 4–6 successively 
but separately introduce one of the variables of interest (Ln(Investors), Equity offered, and Valuations gains) with a common set of 
control variables while Model 7 employs all variables of interest simultaneously. The Model 4, 5 and 6 results separately show that all 
the three variables of interest - Ln(Investors), Equity offered, and Valuations gains – are all significant at the 1% level. 
The variables of interest are all jointly included in our Model 7 and each now remains significant at the 5% level or better. One 
highly novel result from Model 7 is that (annualised) Valuation gains positively affect the outcome of a successful first SECO at the 1% 
level and this supports Hypothesis 3. These gains in the period between campaign starts are interpreted by investors as a certification 
effect of good financial performance and so they reduce adverse selection problems. The results imply that an additional £1 m 
valuation gain between campaign starts increases the probability of conducting a successful first SECO campaign by 1.7%. The sig-
nificant economic role of Valuation gains – which an important piece of new financial information about the ECF firm - supports our 
conjecture that information asymmetries are mitigated in SECO relative to initial ECF campaigns. 
The wisdom of the crowd matters also for a successful first SECO as the coefficient of 0.230 on Ln(Investors) provides strong support 
for Hypothesis 1 in line with the corresponding result in Table 4. The AME show that a 1% increase in the Ln(Investors) increases the 
probability of conducting a successful first SECO campaign by 4.7%. Equity offered is significantly negative and this supports H2. 
Results also suggest that Equity offered in the initial campaign significantly decreases the probability of a successful first SECO 
campaign at the 5% level which supports our Hypothesis 2. This contrasts with the insignificant effect observed in Table 4. The 
economic impact given by the AME show that an increase of 1% in Equity offered lowers the probability of first SECO success by 0.6%. 
A lower amount of equity offered suggests greater commitment by the entrepreneur to the startup and so a lower probability of moral 
hazard issues as established for initial campaigns in Ahlers et al. (2015) and Vismara (2016). 
The findings for control variables are also interesting. The dummy for SECO to initial campaign goal is significantly negative at the 
Table 2 
Summary statistics.  
Variables N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Conducting first SECO 709 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 
First SECO success 105 0.84 0.37 1 1 1 
Ln (Investors) 709 5.06 1.06 4.41 5.08 5.7 
Equity offered (%) 665 14.51 8.1 9.09 13.05 19.05 
Valuation gains (£m) 105 2.17 4.91 0.28 0.85 1.88 
Quick success 709 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 
Firm age 0–3 709 0.68 0.47 0 1 1 
Firm age 4–9 709 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 
Firm age ≥ 10 709 0.07 0.25 0 0 0 
Technology firm 709 0.51 0.5 0 1 1 
Ln (Target capital (£m)) 709 12.17 1.05 11.51 12.06 12.9 
SECO goal to Initial campaign goal 105 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the variables employed in our empirical analysis. See Table A1 for full variable definitions. 
12 We conduct multiple comparison tests across platform shareholder structures on the probability of a firm conducting a (successful) first SECO. It 
employs the delta method and evaluates confidence intervals using the Bonferroni method that is likely to avoid type I errors (Miller 1966). 




Correlation coefficients (Conducting first SECO).    
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Ln (Investors (number)) (1) 1.000           
Equity offered (%) (2) − .058 1.000          
Quick success (3) − .256* .015 1.000         
Firm age 0–3 (4) − .141* .063 .019 1.000        
Firm age 4–9 (5) .134* − .051 − .012 − .846* 1.000       
Firm age ≥ 10 (6) .030 − .030 − .016 − .395* − .155* 1.000      
Technology firm (7) − .040 − .073 − .058 .046 − .007 − .072 1.000     
Ln (Target capital (£m)) (8) .416* .132* − .144* − .371* .323* .130* .052 1.000    
Direct model (Crowdcube) (9) .332* .140* .205* − .012 .062 − .084 − .047 .041 1.000   
Nominee model (Seedrs) (10) − .009 − .241* − .214* .168* − .177* − .006 .025 − .270* − .746* 1.000  
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) (11) − .478* .103* − .025 − .199* .138* .131* .037 .288* − .512* − .190* 1.000 
Note: Correlation matrix among all variables employed in this study. *Indicates significance at the 1% level for the difference from zero of the correlation coefficients. 




Correlation coefficients (First SECO Success).    
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Ln (Investors (number)) (1) 1.000            
Equity offered (%) (2) − .058 1.000           
Valuation gains (£m) (3) .461* − .099 1.000          
Quick success (4) − .256* .015 .184 1.000         
Firm age 0–3 (5) − .141* .063 − .266* .019 1.000        
Firm age 4–9 (6) .134* − .051 .222 − .012 − .846* 1.000       
Firm age ≥ 10 (7) .030 − .030 .138 − .016 − .395* − .155* 1.000      
Technology firm (8) − .040 − .073 .049 − .058 .046 − .007 − .072 1.000     
SECO Goal to Initial Campaign goal (9) − .039 − .162 .116 .156 .073 − .080 .010 − .160 1.000    
Direct model (Crowdcube) (10) .332* .140* .207 .205* − .012 .062 − .084 − .047 .054 1.000   
Nominee model (Seedrs) (11) − .009 − .241* − .181 − .214* .168* − .177* − .006 .025 − .111 − .746* 1.000  
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) (12) − .478* .103* − .059 − .025 − .199* .138* .131* .037 .062 − .512* − .190* 1.000 
Note: Correlation matrix among all variables employed in this study. *Indicates significance at the 1% level for the difference from zero of the correlation coefficients. 
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5% level or lower in Model 7 suggesting that a low initial campaign goal acts as a negative anchor for future campaigns and an in-
dicator of potential moral hazard problems. Technology firms are more likely to be successful which is consistent with the British 
Business Bank (2018) report in which technology firms are the focus of angel investments in the UK. Finally, older firms are less likely 
to conduct successful first SECOs at the 1% level, although the effect is not statistically significant for all models. The negative 
relationship is documented in previous initial ECF campaign studies such as Ralcheva and Roosenboom (2016). Finally, both the 
Nominee and Coinvestment model dummies directly increase the probability of conducting a successful first SECO at the 1% level in all 
models (except for Coinvestment in Model 5). These findings generally support Hypothesis 4a. 
Table 7 shows the contrast estimates (i.e. differences in predicted probabilities between shareholder structures) based on the 
marginal effects related to shareholder structures reported in Table 6 (Model 7). Results suggest that ECF firms employing the Nominee 
and Coinvestment models in their initial campaigns on average are 7.2% and 10.7% more likely to conduct a successful first SECO 
campaign than those ECF firms employing a Direct model (Crowdcube). These results for both platforms are consistent with lower 
potential moral hazard problems. The positive effect of Nominee can be associated with both the lack of separation between ownership 
and control on Seedrs and the monitoring role played by the platform.13 The positive effect of Coinvestment compared to the direct 
model is likely related to the double due diligence and monitoring on SyndicateRoom by both the platform as nominee and the active 
monitoring and mentoring role of the lead investor with skin in the game. Active monitoring and mentoring by professional investors 
have been shown to act as certification for startup quality in the initial campaign and increase the likelihood of success (Ralcheva and 
Roosenboom, 2016). 
Table 4 
The determinants of conducting a first SECO campaign.   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coef. AMEs Coef. AMEs Coef. AMEs 
Ln (Investors (number)) 0.218** 0.046**   0.217** 0.049** 
(2.00) (2.07)   (2.07) (2.15) 
Equity offered (%)   − 0.002 − 0.001 0.000 0.000   
(− 0.44) (− 0.44) (0.01) (0.01) 
Quick success 0.341*** 0.073*** 0.292** 0.067** 0.349*** 0.079*** 
(3.24) (3.44) (2.19) (2.25) (2.91) (3.05) 
Firm age 4–9 − 0.084 − 0.018 − 0.041 − 0.009 − 0.068 − 0.016 
(− 0.75) (− 0.76) (− 0.38) (− 0.38) (− 0.64) (− 0.65) 
Firm age ≥ 10 − 0.654*** − 0.109*** − 0.550*** − 0.102*** − 0.626*** − 0.112*** 
(− 3.99) (− 4.73) (− 2.86) (− 3.40) (− 3.90) (− 4.53) 
Technology firm 0.156 0.033 0.115 0.026 0.149 0.034 
(0.86) (0.88) (0.67) (0.68) (0.77) (0.79) 
Ln (Target capital (£m)) − 0.062 − 0.013 0.073 0.017 − 0.034 − 0.008 
(− 0.73) (− 0.72) (0.96) (0.98) (− 0.43) (− 0.43) 
Shareholder structures 
Nominee model (Seedrs) 0.476*** 0.103*** 0.480*** 0.115*** 0.474*** 0.109*** 
(5.06) (5.09) (3.79) (3.55) (4.11) (3.92) 
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) 1.044*** 0.273*** 0.505*** 0.123*** 0.943*** 0.250*** 
(6.02) (5.46) (5.53) (4.18) (5.63) (5.01) 
N 628  584  584  
Log pseudolikelihood − 242.356  − 239.790  − 237.619  
Pseudo R2 0.145  0.128  0.136  
Note: This table reports the results of probit estimation. All regressions include a constant term and year fixed effects. AMEs refers to average marginal 
effects. Omitted categories are those with firm age 0–3 years old and the direct shareholder model dummy. Z-statistics adjusted for clustering by 
crowdfunding platform are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and ***. 
Table 5 
Shareholder structure (cross-platform) comparisons of predictive margins of conducting a first SECO campaign.   
Contrast Delta-method Bonferroni 
Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Nominee model vs Direct 0.109*** 0.028 0.042 0.175 
Coinvestment model vs Direct 0.250*** 0.050 0.131 0.370 
Coinvestment model vs Nominee 0.142 0.071 − 0.028 0.311 
Notes: This table shows cross-platforms comparisons of marginal effects from results reported in Model 3 (Table 4). Confidence intervals are 
computed using Bonferroni’s method to account for making multiple comparisons. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and 
***. 
13 Existing findings as in La Porta et al. (1997) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) reveal that firms find it more difficult to raise equity 
capital in countries where legal protections for minority shareholders are not strong and the ECF crowd is an example of the latter on some 
platforms. 
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4.3. The moderating effect of platform shareholder structures 
This subsection investigates the impact of changes in our key variables of interest on the probability of conducting a successful first 
SECO campaign across different shareholder structures.14 One can think of these as the partial derivative effects of probability of 
success with respect to a variable of interest for each platform structure. Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients for the interaction 
terms between our continuous variables of interest and the discrete variable capturing the type of platform shareholder structure. 
Interactions between continuous and discrete variables are changes in the continuous variable evaluated at the different values of 
the discrete covariate relative to the base level. The interaction effects in Table 8 suggests that the strength of the impact of the number 
of investors, equity offered and valuation gains on the probability of conducting a successful first SECO vary with platform’s share-
holder structures. However, computing the magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models such as a probit is non-trivial as it 
Table 6 
The determinants of conducting a successful first SECO campaign.   
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Coef. AMEs Coef. AMEs Coef. AMEs Coef. AMEs 
Ln (Investors (number)) 0.361*** 0.078***     0.230** 0.047** 
(3.63) (4.21)     (2.21) (2.19) 
Equity offered (%)   − 0.025*** − 0.005***   − 0.027** − 0.006***   
(− 2.83) (− 3.32)   (− 2.54) (− 3.06) 
Valuation gains (£m)     0.085*** 0.018*** 0.084*** 0.017***     
(3.16) (3.09) (2.66) (2.75) 
Quick success 0.224** 0.048** − 0.059 − 0.013 − 0.038 − 0.008 − 0.104 − 0.021 
(2.27) (2.20) (− 0.53) (− 0.55) (− 0.35) (− 0.36) (− 0.60) (− 0.62) 
Firm age 4–9 − 0.056 − 0.012 0.114 0.024 0.024 0.005 − 0.249 − 0.053 
(− 0.72) (− 0.67) (0.93) (1.03) (0.12) (0.12) (− 0.94) (− 0.84) 
Firm age ≥ 10 − 0.670 − 0.179 − 0.313 − 0.078 − 0.677*** − 0.181** − 1.178*** − 0.320*** 
(− 1.18) (− 1.07) (− 0.46) (− 0.42) (− 2.66) (− 2.51) (− 3.91) (− 4.23) 
Technology firm 0.405** 0.087*** 0.147** 0.032** 0.274* 0.059* 0.183* 0.038* 
(2.44) (2.65) (2.33) (2.24) (1.65) (1.71) (1.82) (1.77) 
SECO Goal to Initial Campaign goal − 0.492 − 0.097* − 0.640** − 0.126*** − 0.564* − 0.110** − 0.698** − 0.129*** 
(− 1.64) (− 1.81) (− 2.42) (− 2.82) (− 1.95) (− 2.19) (− 2.21) (− 2.63) 
Shareholder structures 
Nominee model (Seedrs) 0.602*** 0.126*** 0.283*** 0.058*** 0.526*** 0.104*** 0.343*** 0.072*** 
(4.62) (5.35) (4.01) (3.75) (5.35) (6.97) (3.27) (3.04) 
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) 0.590*** 0.124*** − 0.010 − 0.002 0.155*** 0.036*** 0.556*** 0.107*** 
(2.72) (3.53) (− 0.09) (− 0.09) (3.28) (3.53) (4.26) (3.90) 
N 103  103  103  103  
Log pseudolikelihood − 40.391  − 41.093  − 40.155  − 38.812  
Pseudo R2 0.125  0.109  0.130  0.159  
Note: This table reports the results of probit estimation. All regressions include a constant term and year fixed effects. AMEs refers to average marginal 
effects. Omitted categories are those with firm age 0–3 years old and the direct shareholder model dummy. Z-statistics adjusted for clustering by 
crowdfunding platform are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and ***. 
Table 7 
Shareholder structure (cross-platform) comparisons of predictive margins of a successful first SECO campaign.   
Contrast Delta-method Bonferroni 
Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Nominee vs Direct model 0.072*** 0.024 0.015 0.128 
Coinvestment vs Direct model 0.107*** 0.027 0.041 0.172 
Coinvestment vs Nominee model 0.035*** 0.006 0.019 0.050 
Notes: This table shows cross-platforms comparisons of marginal effects from results reported in Model 7 (Table 6). Confidence intervals are 
computed using Bonferroni’s method to account for making multiple comparisons. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and 
***. 
14 Given the novelty of the results, we only report in this section our findings of the moderating effect of shareholder structures on the probability 
of conducting a successful SECO campaign, but results for conducting a SECO campaign are available in Table A3 and Figures A2, A3 in the Ap-
pendix. Interpretation of the results is similar to the one offered in this subsection. 
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does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term (Ai and Norton, 2003). Thus, to provide a meaningful interpretation of the 
interaction terms, we compute the difference between the predicted probabilities for the interaction terms reported in Table 8, while 
keeping constant a specific type of shareholder structure (Williams, 2012). 
The results of this difference with its statistical significance are reported in Table 9. The results show that the impact of the key 
variables of interest varies considerably with the shareholder structure employed for the campaign.15 Panel A shows that the average 
marginal effect of Ln(Investors) is 0.34 and 0.09 higher when the campaign employs a Direct model instead of the Nominee or 
Coinvestment model, respectively. These results probably reflect the leading role of Crowdcube as the UK’s first and largest ECF 
platform. Finally, the Coinvestment model’s average marginal effect is 0.25 higher than the Nominee model. 
Fig. 1 plots the relationship for platform shareholder structures between the probability of a first SECO success as the Ln(Investors) 
variable increases.This shows that the marginal (∂y/∂x) or cet. par. effects of Ln(Investors) vary in a sometimes complex manner. The 
Nominee (and, to a lesser extent, the Coinvestment) model dominates the Direct with virtually sure success (p = 1) for low investor 
numbers up to approximately 55 (e4) investors. Thereafter, it exhibits a piecewise linear downward slope and the other platform 
models dominate in terms of higher probabilities of a first SECO success with convergent probabilities of success. These contrasting 
patterns are consistent with existing studies in which investment behaviour varies among crowd members (Wallmeroth, 2019; Vis-
mara, 2019) in initial ECF campaigns, but previous studies did not distinguish separate platform shareholder structures in this context. 
Panel B of Table 9 show that the average marginal effect of equity offered is 0.006 and 0.014 higher when the Nominee model is 
employed instead of the Direct and Coinvestment models, respectively. Fig. 2 complement graphically these findings and shows the 
relation between the probability of success in the first SECO and Equity offered across shareholder structures. 
Apart from extremely low values of Equity offered (<10%), the Nominee model increasingly dominates the other two model in 
terms of the probability of a successful first SECO. This reflects the fact that the Seedrs platform as nominee plays an active role in 
monitoring its ECF firms (including its fair value valuation) and this reduces the probability of moral hazard issues. Moreover, in the 
case of potentially opportunistic behaviour on the part of the startup, the platform can readily act as a blockholder for all ECF investors 
through electronic voting to resolve such issues. This is likely to be the case as most initial and SECO campaigns offer more than 10% of 
equity, the threshold at or above which shareholders can demand a special meeting with the startup. The probability of conducting a 
successful first SECO Campaigns employing the Coinvestment and Direct models decreases as equity offered increases in line with the 
aggregate results. However, the Coinvestment model has a steeper downward slope for Equity offered higher than 15%. 
Panel C of Table 9 shows the average marginal effect of Valuation gains is 0.035 and 0.064 lower when a Coinvestment model is 
employed instead of a Direct or Nominee model respectively. Fig. 3 plots the relationship between probability of conducting a suc-
cessful first SECO campaign and Valuation gains across shareholder structures. 
All platform models exhibit a positive slope implying that the higher the Valuation gains, the greater the probability of success. 
However, the overwhelming conclusion is that the Nominee model dominates the other two models (for all but tiny gains) as Valuation 
gains increase with success probabilities very close to 1. This may well reflect the fact the Nominee model (Seedrs) is more focused on 
valuation as a normal part of its evolving secondary market operations. The probability of success increases with Valuation gains for 
the other two platform model albeit with quite different slopes. While the Coinvestment model exhibits a gently increasing success 
probability, the Direct model starts lower but then exhibits a steadily increasing success probability that gradually gets closer to the 
Nominee model as Valuation gains increase. 
The overwhelming conclusion from Table 9 and Figs. 1 to 3 is that the Nominee model dominates the Direct and Coinvestment 
model in terms of the probability of a first SECO success as each of our variables of interest vary (with the exception of large investor 
numbers). The implication is that Seedrs’ lack of ownership and control separation and regular monitoring and valuations of startups 
mitigates both adverse selection and potential moral hazard problems relating to a successful first SECO. Overall, the results underline 
the importance of platform shareholder structures in affecting the probability of conducting a successful first SECO campaign through 
our variables of interest, providing support for Hypothesis 4b.16 This is consistent with studies such as Cumming et al. (2019b), Rossi 
and Vismara (2018) and Rossi et al. (2019) that stress the importance of ECF platform differences for initial campaigns. 
5. Conclusions 
Seasoned equity crowdfunded offerings (SECOs) are the crowdfunding equivalent of SEOs on the stock market. The central un-
derlying idea of this paper is that, just as SEO (seasoned equity offering) firms are likely to face fewer information asymmetry problems 
relative to IPO firms as Chemmanur et al. (2010) argue, the same applies to SECO relative to initial ECF campaign firms. This first 
contribution of this paper is that it provides a first investigation into what factors prompt firms to conduct a first SECO and the drivers 
of its success for an initial sample of 709 firms that enjoyed successful initial campaigns on the top three UK platforms – Crowdcube, 
Seedrs, and SyndicateRoom – over the 2011–2018 period. The probit results establish that new information available at a SECO such as 
15 The importance of analysing platform-level effects for initial ECF campaigns is stressed by Rossi and Vismara (2018).  
16 Additional results on the determinants of firms conducting multiple SECOs suggest that shareholder structures based on the Coinvestment and 
Nominee models increases the probability of conducting multiple SECOs. Results are available in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
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Table 8 
The determinants of a successful first SECO campaign: interactions with shareholder structures.   
Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a 
Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Ln (Investors (number)) 0.441***   
(3.57)   
Ln (Investors (number)) * Nominee model (Seedrs) − 2.324***   
(− 9.84)   
Ln (Investors (number)) * Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) − 0.295   
(− 1.13)   
Equity offered (%)  − 0.020**   
(− 2.45)  
Equity offered (%) * Nominee model (Seedrs)  0.030***   
(9.06)  
Equity offered (%) * Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom)  − 0.034***   
(− 5.51)  
Valuation gains (£m)   0.164***   
(3.67) 
Valuation gains (£m) * Nominee model (Seedrs)   0.367*   
(1.82) 
Valuation gains (£m) * Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom)   − 0.141***   
(− 6.36) 
Shareholder structures 
Nominee model (Seedrs) 11.997*** − 0.037 0.345** 
(9.75) (− 0.31) (2.29) 
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) 1.839** 0.557*** 0.469*** 
(2.53) (4.80) (5.34) 
N 103 103 103 
Log pseudolikelihood − 38.371 − 40.478 − 39.149 
Pseudo R2 0.168 0.123 0.151 
Full set of controls YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the results of a probit estimation. All regressions include a constant term, year fixed effects and a full set of control variables 
as reported in Models 4,5 and 6 (Table 7). Omitted categories are those with firm age 0–3 years old and the direct shareholder model dummy. Z- 
statistics adjusted for clustering by crowdfunding platform are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** 
and ***. 
Table 9 
Shareholder structure (cross-platform) comparisons of predictive margins of a successful first SECO campaign.   
Contrast Delta-method Bonferroni Bonferroni 
Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PANEL A: ∂y/∂x with respect to ln(Investors) 
Nominee vs Direct model − 0.340*** 0.020 − 17.260 0.000 − 0.388 − 0.293 
Coinvestment vs Direct model − 0.089*** 0.030 − 2.960 0.009 − 0.161 − 0.017 
Coinvestment vs Nominee model 0.251*** 0.033 7.620 0.000 0.172 0.330 
PANEL B: ∂y/∂x with respect to Equity offered 
Nominee vs Direct model 0.006*** 0.000 15.270 0.000 0.005 0.007 
Coinvestment vs Direct model − 0.007*** 0.002 − 3.440 0.002 − 0.012 − 0.002 
Coinvestment vs Nominee model − 0.014*** 0.002 − 6.190 0.000 − 0.019 − 0.008 
PANEL C: ∂y/∂x with respect to Valuation gains 
Nominee vs Direct model 0.029 0.020 1.470 0.429 − 0.019 0.077 
Coinvestment vs Direct model − 0.035*** 0.004 − 9.090 0.000 − 0.044 − 0.026 
Coinvestment vs Nominee model − 0.064** 0.023 − 2.760 0.017 − 0.120 − 0.008 
Notes: This table shows cross-platforms comparisons of average marginal effects from results reported in Table 8. Confidence intervals and z-statistics 
are computed using Bonferroni’s method to account for making multiple comparisons. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** 
and ***. 
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Fig. 1. Predictive marginal effects for the probability of a successful first SECO by number of investors and shareholder structures. 
Predictive margins are presented with their 95% confidence intervals. 
Fig. 2. Predictive marginal effects for the probability of a successful first SECO by equity offered and shareholder structures. 
Predictive margins are presented with their 95% confidence intervals. 
Fig. 3. Predictive marginal effects for the probability of a successful first SECO by valuation gains and shareholder structures. 
Predictive margins are presented with their 95% confidence intervals. 
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pre-money valuation gains reduces adverse selection problems for a first SECO success. Annualised valuation gains between the initial 
and SECO campaigns increase the probability of having a successful first SECO campaign. The probability of a first SECO success also 
increases with investor numbers or the wisdom of the crowd but it falls with the amount of equity offered. These findings complement 
and extend the findings of Signori and Vismara (2018) on SECOs on the Crowdcube platform. 
The second contribution is that the paper sheds light on how platform shareholder structures impact on the probability of SECO 
success. The average marginal effects for a successful first SECO show that campaigns employing the nominee (Seedrs) and coin-
vestment (SyndicateRoom) models directly increase the probability of a successful first SECO by 7.2% and 10.7%, respectively, relative 
to employing a direct model (Crowdcube). This is likely due to reduced moral hazard problems due to the enhanced monitoring effects 
by the platforms. Our results complement and extend those of Hornuf et al. (2018) and Signori and Vismara (2018) - who focus on 
follow-up private (VC and BA) funding in ECF firms - by accounting for the effects of platform shareholder structures on the likelihood 
of a firm conducting a (successful) first SECO. 
We also study the moderating effect of ECF platforms as our three variables of interest are allowed to vary across different 
shareholder structures. The conclusion from this is that the nominee model dominates the direct and coinvestment models in terms of 
the probability of conducting a successful first SECO campaign (SECOs with large investor numbers are an exception). The implication 
is that Seedrs’ lack of separation between ownership and control and its monitoring and regular valuations of startups mitigate both 
adverse selection and potential moral hazard problems relating to a successful first SECO. Overall, the results underline the importance 
of platform shareholder structures in exerting both direct and indirect effects on the probability of conducting a successful first SECO 
campaign.17 
Our paper has a number of limitations and these may provide opportunities for future research. Even though this study employs the 
largest SECO sample to date, one limitation is that our sample is still rather small, and this may have influenced the results. Future 
studies may benefit from having access to larger samples as SECO numbers seem to be on the rise in the UK (British Business Bank, 
2019). Moreover, it would also be worthwhile to investigate whether serial SECOs become a feature of the ECF landscape just as serial 
SEOs have come to predominate on London’s Alternative Investment Market (Stamou et al., 2020). In this context, our current serial 
SECO sample is very small. Another limitation is that lack of data prevents us from studying investment motivation. The latter may 
vary regarding involvement in SECOs as existing studies argue that ECF investment behaviour is heterogeneous (Wallmeroth, 2019; 
Vismara, 2019). It would be interesting to extend our sample, but the study of cross platform effects would be more complex as the 
Crowdcube platform is now allowing nominee account campaigns whilst the Seedrs platform is permitting direct ownership cam-
paigns. This is further supported by heterogeneity in local bias for venture capitalists (Cumming and Dai, 2010). We leave the effect of 
these developments for future research. 
Appendix A. Tables and Figures  
Table A1 
Variable definition.  
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variables 
Conducting first SECO Dummy = 1 if firm conducts a first SECO. 
First SECO Success Dummy = 1 if firm has a successful first SECO. 
Variables of interest 
Ln (Investors (number)) Natural logarithm of the number of investors participating in campaign. 
Equity offered (%) Fraction of equity offered (%). 
Valuation gains (£m) Annualised pre-SECO equity valuation less pre- initial campaign equity valuation. 
Control variables 
Quick Success Dummy = 1 if the target (amount of capital to be raised in initial offering) was reached within 20 days. 
Firm age 0–3 Firm age 0–3. 
Firm age 4–9 Firm age 4–9. 
Firm age ≥ 10 Firm age ≥ 10. 
Technology firm Dummy = 1 if firm operates in the Technology Hardware & Equipment sector. 
Ln (Target capital (£m)) Natural logarithm of the amount of capital to be raised in initial offering (£k). 
SECO Goal to Initial Campaign goal Dummy = 1 if (SECO goal / Initial Campaign goal) >1 
Direct Model Dummy = 1 if campaign was conducted on Crowdcube (UK). 
Nominee model Dummy = 1 if campaign was conducted on Seedrs (UK). 
Coinvestment model Dummy = 1 if campaign was conducted on SyndicateRoom (UK). 
Note: This table presents the definitions of the variables employed in this paper.   
17 Table A4 results in the Appendix look at the determinants of firms conducting multiple SECOs suggest that shareholder structures based on the 
Coinvestment model and Nominee model increases the probability of conducting multiple SECOs. These are outside the scope of the present study 
however. 
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Fig. A1. Number of follow-on SECOs.   
Table A2 
Heckman probit results. The determinants of a first SECO (Selection equation) and a successful first SECO campaign (Outcome equation).   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Ln (Investors (number)) 0.217** 0.352***     0.213** 0.161 
(2.03) (3.12)     (2.10) (1.54) 
Equity offered (%)   − 0.003 − 0.025***   − 0.000 − 0.028***   
(− 0.52) (− 3.26)   (− 0.04) (− 3.08) 
Valuation gains (£m)      0.084***  0.084***      
(2.89)  (2.63) 
Quick success 0.346*** 0.200* 0.298** − 0.177 0.299*** − 0.121 0.348*** − 0.256*** 
(3.38) (1.88) (2.27) (− 1.30) (2.64) (− 1.00) (3.09) (− 3.12) 
Firm age 4–9 − 0.082 − 0.053 − 0.046 0.106 − 0.048 0.028 − 0.068 − 0.223 
(− 0.73) (− 0.85) (− 0.45) (0.75) (− 0.44) (0.16) (− 0.67) (− 0.97) 
Firm age ≥ 10 − 0.649*** − 0.636 − 0.550*** − 0.157 − 0.559*** − 0.558 − 0.624*** − 0.973* 
(− 4.00) (− 0.90) (− 3.03) (− 0.19) (− 2.95) (− 1.03) (− 4.06) (− 1.71) 
Technology firm 0.156 0.401** 0.112 0.115 0.126 0.256 0.146 0.150* 
(0.88) (2.54) (0.69) (1.24) (0.81) (1.43) (0.77) (1.86) 
Ln (Target capital (£m)) − 0.062  0.078  0.044  − 0.033  
(− 0.73)  (0.90)  (0.52)  (− 0.42)  
Ln (Competing offerings) 0.082  0.041  0.054  0.019  
(0.96)  (0.23)  (0.37)  (0.13)  
SECO Goal to Initial Campaign goal  − 0.495*  − 0.613*  − 0.556*  − 0.687**  
(− 1.71)  (− 1.94)  (− 1.85)  (− 2.05) 
Shareholder structures 
Nominee model (Seedrs) 0.567*** 0.583*** 0.526*** 0.175 0.556*** 0.451* 0.493*** 0.228 
(4.07) (3.38) (2.75) (1.07) (4.98) (1.83) (2.59) (1.45) 
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) 1.178*** 0.551 0.566 − 0.133 0.688** 0.059 0.963*** 0.318 
(37.41) (1.50) (1.45) (− 0.50) (2.13) (0.23) (8.29) (1.25) 
Athrho − 0.063 − 0.382 − 0.260 − 0.364 
(− 0.15) (− 0.54) (− 0.39) (− 0.66) 
ρ − 0.063 − 0.364 − 0.254 − 0.349 
N 709 665 709 665 
Selected 105 105 105 105 
Nonselected 604 560 604 560 
Log pseudolikelihood − 282.711 − 280.704 − 284.753 − 276.267 
Wald test of indep. Eqns (ρ = 0) 0.021 0.289 0.153 0.430 
chi-squared 0.884 0.591 0.696 0.512 
Notes: This table present the results from a Heckman probit model with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) which is estimated using 
the Stata “Heckprobit” routine (StataCorp, 2019). The selection equation relates to the probability of conducting a first seasoned equity crowdfunded 
offering (SECO) after a successful initial campaign. The outcome equation relates to the probability of a successful first SECO. All regressions include a 
constant term and year fixed effects. We use (Competing offerings) as exclusion restriction, defined as the natural logarithm of the number of other 
offerings active and available on the same platform in the same year to allow identification of the model (Signori and Vismara, 2018). Omitted 
categories are those with firm age 0–3 years old and the Direct model (Crowdcube) dummy. Z-statistics adjusted for clustering by crowdfunding 
platform are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***.  
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Table A3 
The determinants of conducting a first SECO campaign: interactions with shareholder structures.   
Model 1a Model 2a 
Coef. Coef. 
Ln (Investors (number)) 0.230***  
(4.21)  
Ln (Investors (number)) * Nominee model (Seedrs) − 0.237***  
(− 6.37)  
Ln (Investors (number)) * Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) 0.599***  
(21.23)  
Equity offered (%)  0.002  
(0.46) 
Equity offered (%) * Nominee model (Seedrs)  0.005  
(0.96) 
Equity offered (%) * Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom)  − 0.022***  
(− 4.04) 
Shareholder structures 
Nominee model (Seedrs) 1.636*** 0.442** 
(6.14) (2.16) 
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) − 1.166*** 0.855*** 
(− 26.26) (32.61) 
N 628 584 
Log pseudolikelihood − 240.040 − 239.004 
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.131 
Full set of controls YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the results of a probit estimation. All regressions include a constant term, year fixed effects 
and a full set of control variables as reported in Models 1 and 2 (Table 4). Omitted categories are those with firm age 
0–3 years old and the direct shareholder model dummy. Z-statistics adjusted for clustering by crowdfunding platform 
are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and ***.  
Table A4 
Count model for determinants of conducting multiple SECOs.  
Dependent variable: Number of follow-on campaigns Zero-inflated negative binomial regression Poisson regression 
Coef. AMEs Coef. AMEs 
Ln (Investors (number)) 0.254* 0.047* 0.248* 0.046* 
(1.83) (1.82) (1.77) (1.77) 
Equity offered (%) 0.000 0.000 − 0.001 − 0.000 
(0.03) (0.03) (− 0.06) (− 0.06) 
Quick success 0.563*** 0.105*** 0.556*** 0.104*** 
(5.32) (5.20) (5.37) (5.37) 
Firm age 4–9 0.110 0.022 0.130 0.026 
(0.92) (0.90) (1.21) (1.18) 
Firm age ≥ 10 − 0.989*** − 0.119*** − 0.979*** − 0.117*** 
(− 3.49) (− 5.05) (− 3.39) (− 4.85) 
Technology firm 0.234 0.044 0.249 0.046 
(0.92) (0.91) (1.01) (1.01) 
Ln (Target capital (£m)) 0.069 0.001 0.003 0.000 
(0.61) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
Shareholder structures 
Nominee model (Seedrs) 0.548*** 0.107** 0.512*** 0.099** 
(2.93) (2.40) (3.09) (2.55) 
Coinvestment model (SyndicateRoom) 1.109*** 0.299*** 1.093*** 0.294*** 
(5.06) (3.01) (4.41) (2.67) 
Inflate 
Ln (Target capital (£m)) 1.092***    
(2.84)    
Constant − 16.377***    
(− 3.30)    
Lnalpha − 2.965    
(− 0.41)    
N 665  665  
Number of zero observations 560  560  
Log pseudolikelihood − 288.774  − 289.119  
Note: AMEs refers to average marginal effects. Omitted categories are firms age 0–3 years old and the direct model dummy. The model includes year 
Fixed Effects. lnalpha is the natural log of alpha (the dispersion parameter). The inflated portion of the output refers to the logistic model predicting 
the probability that the count is zero (i.e. the number of additional SECOs = 0). If the dispersion parameter is zero, then a Poisson model would be 
appropriate. Z-statistics adjusted for clustering by crowdfunding platform are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, ** and ***.  
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Fig. A2. Predictive marginal effects for the probability of conducting a first SECO by number of investors and shareholder structures. 
Notes: Predictive margins are presented with their 95% confidence intervals.  
Fig. A3. Predictive marginal effects for the probability of conducting a first SECO by equity offered and shareholder structures. 
Notes: Predictive margins are presented with their 95% confidence intervals. 
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